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The law governing registered schemes 
The second part of this article looks more closely at the 
regulatory arrangements that apply once a scheme is regis-
tered under Chapter SC of the Corporations Law. These 
include the duties of responsible entities and their officers, 
the mandatory governance structures, and member voting 
rights in registered schemes. 
Pamela F. Hanrahan Special Counsel, Allens Arthur Robinson, 
Melbourne; and Deputy Director, Centre for Corporate Law and 
Securities Regulation, University of Melbourne 
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The Corporations Law is the name given to the parallel Acts of each of the 
Australian Commonwealth and State Parliaments that are intended to 
create a single national law governing corporations, securities and 
related matters. The Corporations Law commenced on January I. 1991. 
At the time of writing, it is expected that the Corporations Law will be re-
enacted as the Corporations Act 2001 (an Act of the Commonwealth 
Parliament) following referral by the Australian States to the Common-
wealth of the power to make laws relating to corporations and linancial 
services. The new national legislation, which does not differ in substance 
from the current law, should commence on July 15, 2001, and is intended 
to overcome possible constitutional defects in the existing Corporations 
Law structure. 
In this article, the term •tund manager" is used generally to describe the 
promoter and operator of the scheme. 
Commonwealth of Australia, Financial System Inquiry Final Report (March 
1997), para. 11.2. 
All figures are ia Australian dollars. 
ASS!RT, Market Share Report-March Quarter 2000 (April 2000). 
Publicly offered superannuation products were also regulated under this 
regime from January l, 1991 until the commencement of SISA in 1994. 
A trustee related to the manager was permitted in limited circumstances, 
under ASC Policy Statement 90 (September 18, 1995). 
ASC Polley Statement 98 (February 6, 1995), para. 22. 
ASC Policy Statement 89 (February 6, 1995), paras 22-28. For a more 
detailed discussion of the respective roles of the management company 
and the trustee under the prescribed interest laws, see P. Hanrahan, 
Managed Investments Law and Practice (CCH Australia Limited, Sydney, 
2000), para. 2-300; and P. von Nessen, A Practical Guide to Managed 
Investments (LBC Information Services, Sydney, 1998), chapter 2. 
For existing prescribed interest schemes, the MIA provided for a two-year 
transitional period, to July l, 2000. 
Al...RC/CASAC, Collective Investments Other People's Money (Report No. 65, 
1993), para. 12.3. 
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ibid., para. 11. 
For a more complete treatment of the collective investments review and 
the legislative history and development of the MIA, see Hanrahan, n. 9 
above, paras 2-400 to 2-600; and P. Hanrahan, "(lr)responsible Entities: 
Reforming Manager Accountablllty in Public Unit Trusts" (1998) 16 Com-
pany and Securities Law Journal 76-92. 
ASIC policy is an important part of the regulatory framework for managed 
Investment schemes. ASIC has the power under the Corporations Law to 
modify the operation of Chapter SC, or to grant exemptions from it, in 
spec:lfic or general cases. The basis on which it will exercise this power is 
explained (along with other matters related to Its administration of the 
Corporations Law) in Policy Statements, Practice Notes, Class Orders, pro 
forma instruments, Information releases and other documents. These 
documents are available on the ASIC website, at www.aslc.gov.au. 
s. 708 exempts small-scale personal offers (s. 708(1)). offers to certain 
sophisticated and professional investors (s. 708(8)-(11)), offers to 
executive officers of the operator (s. 708(12)), some offers to existing 
members of a registered scheme (s. 708(13)(b)), offers involving no 
consideration (s. 708(15)) and offers made in connection with a takeover 
or scheme of arrangement (s. 708(17) and (18)) from the disclosure 
requirements. 
s. 601EB(l)(d). These requirements are contained in s. 60!FA. The 
licensing requirements are discussed below. 
s. 601EB(l)(e). Under s. 601GA, the constitution must deal adequately 
with the consideration that is to be paid to acquire an interest in the 
scheme, the powers of the responsible entity in investing or dealing with 
scheme assets, complaints resolution, winding up and, where relevant, 
the responsible entity's fees and right to be indemnified for costs and 
expenses, the responsible entity's power to borrow money, and the 
members' right to withdraw . 
s . 601EB(l)(f) and (g). The compliance plan must be signed by the 
directors under s. 60 lHC. The contents of a compliance plan are 
prescribed by s. 601HA. In particular, It must Include arrangements for 
ensuring the ldentlflcatlon and separation of scheme assets, the proper 
functioning of the compliance committee (If there ts one) , regular 
valuation of scheme assets, audit of compliance with the plan, and 
adequate record·keeping. 
s . 601EB(l) (h). Section 601HG contains the requirements for audit of 
compliance with the scheme's compliance plan. 
See s. 784 and ASIC Policy Statement 130.32-130.63. Different criteria 
are used to assess these !actors, depending on the type of scheme. For 
example, for schemes Investing in financial assets, ASIC will usually 
require that the relevant officers have tertiary qualilications in business, 
accounting or actuarial studies. 
s. 784(2A) and ASIC Policy Statement 131.12-131.14. 
s. 784(2A)-(2D). The basis for calculating net tangible assets is set out 
in ASIC Policy Statement 131.24-131.26B. Generally, ASIC will approve 
guarantees provided by Australian ADls, foreign banks regulated under 
the Basie Committee standards, and parent or slbllng entity guarantees 
where the guarantor has net tangible assets of at least A$50 mi!Uon. 
ASIC Policy Statement 131.20- 131.23. 
ASIC Policy Statement 131.15 and 131.16. 
Malta 
The Functions and First Two Decisions of the Malta 
Stock Exchange Tribunal 
The S_toc_~ Excl,lange Act of 1990 Act came into force in 1992. 
The Act established the Council of the Exchange as a regula-
tory authority responsible for the licensing and supervis ion 
of stockbrokers, the listing of securities and the monitoring of 
trading on the Maltese Borsa set up by the same law. The 
Malta Stock Exchange Tribunal was created by Part III of the 
Act, which also introduced the first ever rules on insider 
dealing in Maltese legislation. 
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Since 1994, however, the principal legislation on insider 
dealing is the Insider Dealing Act of that year. Some of the 
original rules of the 1990 Act have been retained, including 
the provisions dealing with the TribunaL The Insider Dealing 
Act of 1994 is largely of a criminal law nature; it establishes a 
number of insider offences and it does not provide a civil 
remedy for losses suffered consequent to a breach of the 
insider dealing provisions. The 1994 Act was broadly mod-
©Sweet & Maxwell Ltd (&Contributors) 2001 
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elled on the U.K. Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act of 
1985 (now repealed) . 
The primary function of the Tribunal is to investigate 
allegations or suspicions of insider dealing and other activity 
termed as other "irregular practices in Exchange dealings" on 
the Malta Stock Exchange. The Tribunal has no criminal 
jurisdiction and it is the only authority which, under Maltese 
law, may order persons found guilty of criminal insider deal-
ing to pay compensation to an injured party who has suffered 
financial loss . 
The 1990 Act assigns to the Malta Stock Exchange Tribunal 
a number of other significant investor protection functions: 
(a) The Tribunal may investigate exchange dealings entered 
into by unauthorised operators and it may provide for 
the recovery of proceeds or other assets and the pay-
ment of compensation to clients. 
(b) It may intervene and issue orders and directives to 
prevent a contravention of any of the provisions of the 
Act. 
(c) In certain designated circumstances, it may cancel, sus-
pend or restrict the licence of a stockbroker who is not 
abiding by the established regulations or Stock Exchange 
by-laws. 
The Tribunal consists of a Chairman, who must be an 
advocate with a minimum of twelve years practice, and two 
other members possessing relevant expertise and experi-
ence. It is appointed for a period of three years; the minimum 
term allowed by law. The Act obliges the Tribunal to "deal 
with any matter before it as expeditiously as possible and 
shall give its decision without delay". It was only during 1999 
that the first two cases were submitted to the Tribunal. These 
were concluded in 2000. 
The Malta Stock Exchange Tribunal has to be carefully 
1 distinguished from another tribunal operating in the financial 
services sector, known as the financial Services Tribunal 
(FST). The FST plays no significant investor protection func-
tion. It was set up to provide a swift and competent mechanism 
of review for the benefit of operators who may feel aggrieved 
by a decision of the regulatory authorities under the laws 
regulating banking, investment services, insurance and cer-
tain other financial activities. It has competence to review a 
variety of regulatory decisions including the "refusal, varia-
l tion, cancellation or suspension of a licence". 
( The FST may "confirm, reverse or vary the decision of the 
competent authority", but it may only intervene where a 
; regulatory body has wrongly applied the law or has abused of 
its discretionery powers. Any party may appeal exclusively 
on points of law to the Court of Appeal. 
Although these two tribunals have widely different func-
tions, the same persons have been appointed to serve on 
both Tribunals because the qualifications are similar. The 
sittings of both Tribunals are open to the public but In 
particular cases it may deemed more proper to conduct the 
proceedings in private. The decisions, however, are always 
given in public. 
Current proposals for legislative reforms foresee the end 
of the Malta Stock Exchange Tribunal and the extension of the 
competence of the FST to stockbrokers licensed under the 
1990 Act. This would certainly streamline the situation and 
remove certain anomalies inherent in the Tribunal's func-
tions, some of which seem to be more of a regulatory or 
administrative nature rather than of a judicial nature. 
The following is a brief note on the first two cases con-
cluded by the Tribunal during 2000. 
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Malta Stock Exchange Tribunal, case number 1 : 
prolonged suspension of trading of a listed 
security; case withdrawn following a joint 
declaration 
The very first case that was submitted to the Tribunal was 
withdrawn following a joint declaration issued by the two 
parties on January 13, 2000. The case involved a complaint by 
the minority shareholders of a leading listed bank against the 
prolonged suspension of trading of the bank's shares pending 
the proposed acquisition of the majority shareholding from 
government by a foreign bank. 
When the proceedii:igs opened in 1999, the Council of the 
Exchange pleaded that-the Tribunal had no competence to 
hear the case. It argued that the phrase "alleged or suspected 
irregular practices on the Exchange", used in the Malta Stock 
Exchange Act could not reasonably be interpreted to apply to 
regulatory decisions of the Council itself. It was intended to 
cover private transactions and acts carried out by stockbro-
kers or investors. 
In the joint declaration, the minority shareholders de-
clared that they accepted the explanations given by the 
Exchange for the prolonged suspension of trading. During the 
course of the proceedings, the Exchange introduced new by-
laws to safeguard the interests of minority shareholders in 
the event of a possible de-listing. 
The Malta Stock Exchange Tribunal case number 2: 
investigation into alleged insider dealing; increase 
in share capital; competence of the Tribunal; proof 
required of unpublished price sensitive information 
of a precise nature 
Towards the end of 2000, the Malta Stock Exchange Tribunal 
concluded its first ever inquiry into an alleged instance of 
insider dealing. The allegation concerned a local bank whose 
shares are listed on the Malta Stock Exchange. The chairman 
of this bank also sat on the board of a foreign corporate 
shareholder, which held the biggest, though minority, 
shareholding in the local company. No single shareholder 
held a majority of shares. 
The allegation arose from an interpretation of a series of 
circumstances originating out of a general policy decision by 
the local listed company to increase the share capital by 
means of a future bonus issue in favour of existing sharehold-
ers. This decision was taken at a regularly held board meeting 
of the local company and was to be put in place at some 
undefined date in the future. Earlier, the foreign shareholder 
had expressly declared their desire and intention to increase 
their shareholding in the company. It had also officially 
applied for and obtained clearance from the Central Bank of 
Malta, the banking regulator, to increase its shareholding in 
the company. 
Subsequent to this resolution, but before the actual in-
crease in the share capital was implemented, the foreign 
shareholder acquired a relatively small number of shares on 
the Stock Exchange according to normal procedures. 
The investigation centred on the possible culpability of the 
foreign shareholder and of its director who served as chair-
man of the local company. The suggestion was that the 
foreign shareholder, acting on the basis of the unpublished 
board decision to make the bonus issue sometime in the 
future, was positioning itself in order to increase its eventual 
entitlement to bonus shares. 
Under the 1990 Act, the Tribunal has competence to inves-
tigate allegations of "alleged or suspected irregular practices 
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in Exchange dealings". Noting that the 1990 Act did not define 
this phrase, the Tribunal decided that it covered "all kinds of 
mischief and wrongdoings, be they great or small", including 
acts amounting to insider dealing, despite the fact that a 
specific law on this subject had in the meantime been passed 
by Parliament in 1994. The Tribunal reasoned that following 
the adoption of this Act, it should now apply the definition 
given to insider dealing provided in the Act. 
The Tribunal noted that under the 1994 Act, only individu-
als (and not companies) could be found guilty of criminal 
insider dealing. However, the Tribunal held that it could still 
investigate corporate wrongdoing because the 1990 Act did 
not preclude this possibility. This was probably correct as 
the Tribunal's competence was administrative and not crimi-
nal - after all, in the event that the Tribunal decides that 
insider dealing had been committed, it could only adopt 
administrative measures allowed under the 1990 Act. as well 
as possibly report its findings to the Council of the Stock 
Exchange and to the police authorities for any further action 
these may consider appropriate. 
The Tribunal reasoned that the whole case before it de-
pended on proof that there had been wrongful use of 
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unpublished price sensitive information "of a precise n 
ture". If this aspect was not proved, the case would fail. 
Following its investigations, the Tribunal found that 1 
"concrete" information had been available to the sharehol 
ers and directors at the time when the share purchases we 
made: "The information at the time was sketchy and far fro 
complete." The information then available was not such th 
if made public, it could have had a significant impact on ti 
price: " .. . the information relating to the rights issue availab 
at the time the purchases were made was so scant that 
could not have significantly effected the price of the (bank' 
shares had it been made public. It is relevant to point out th . 
the law uses the word significant, meaning that it is n· 
concerned with trivial information which only slightly affec 
the price." 
The Tribunal concluded that that both the chairman ar 
the foreign shareholder had acted correctly, and that the 
were insufficient grounds to justify further investigating ti 
allegation (decision taken on October 6, 2000). 
David Fabri Department of Commercial Law, University 
Malta 
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